by
Arnaud de Borchgrave* [Filed 11/07/11]
Iran's nuclear ambitions predate the clerical dictatorship that
overthrew the monarchy in 1979. The last monarch, Mohammad
Reza Shah Pahlavi, reached the same conclusion when Britain, in 1968, suddenly relinquished all of its geopolitical
responsibilities east of Suez—from Singapore to the
Suez Canal, including the Persian Gulf
and the oil that then fueled most of the Western world.
Throughout the post-World War II era, Pax Britannica in the
Gulf was costing Her Majesty's government $40 million a year.
The Nixon Doctrine stepped into the vacuum left by London's decision. This, in turn, led to the anointment of the
shah as the guardian of the Persian Gulf that bore the name of Iran's worldly past.
At its height in 500 B.C., the Persian Empire had conquered Asia as far as the Indus River to the east, and Greece and North Africa (including
Egypt and Libya to the west. Delusions of grandeur came easily to the
shah and then to his turn-the-clock-back theocratic successors.
In 1972, the shah predicted to this reporter that one day Iran would be a full-fledged nuclear power, anointed by the
Nixon Doctrine to keep the Soviet Union and its friend, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, from troublemaking in the Persian Gulf.
The shah explained that his armed forces had to be able to
react in half a day to counteract any attempt by the Soviet
bloc and its friends to stage a coup in any of the
then-disunited sheikdoms and emirates. This led to Iran's purchase of Boeing 747s and huge hovercraft as troop
carriers.
In retrospect, it does not take an overwhelming effort of
imagination to see how Iran's superannuated ayatollahs would spare no effort to get
their hands on the ultimate weapon.
In 1987, Pakistan and Iran signed a secret agreement on "peaceful nuclear
cooperation," which was the cover for Iranian scientists to be
given centrifuge training in Pakistan.
In 1992, Pakistan began missile cooperation with North Korea - in return for nuclear weapons know-how. This led to
Pakistan's Ghauri missile, a copy of North Korea's No Dong design.
Among the cognoscenti, there was never any doubt that
Iran's constantly denied objective is to achieve nuclear
weapons capability. Five of the world's nine nuclear powers
are in Iran's geopolitical vicinity—Russia to the north, Israel to the west, Pakistan to the east and the U.S. 5th Fleet (with tactical nuclear weapons) to the south.
Many in Israel concluded that the Jewish state would be the ayatollahs'
principal objective. But unless Iran's decision-makers have taken leave of their critical
faculties, they know Israel could incinerate their domain back to the Stone Age.
There are those in Israel's governing circles who advocate pre-emption. Three of
Israel's recently retired intelligence chiefs, including Mossad,
Shin Bet and military intelligence, have publicly voiced angry
dissent.
U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commanders—Gen. Anthony Zinni,
Gen. John Abizaid and Adm. William J. Fallon—have said on the
record in recent years, namely that bombing Iran's nuclear facilities would be a grave geopolitical
mistake.
Gen. David H. Petraeus, now the CIA director, also had
serious reservations when he was CENTCOM commander from 2008
to 2010.
Iran has had several years' notice to dig deep for its most
sensitive nuclear operations. Second, Israel's fighter bombers
barely have the range to reach one or several of Iran's
nuclear installations, and air-to-air refueling would have to
take place over Turkey, Jordan, Iraq or Saudi Arabia.
What former CENTCOM commanders and Israeli intelligence
chiefs have in common is intimate knowledge of Iran's formidable asymmetrical retaliatory capabilities. One
bomb on Iran and oil prices could shoot up to $300 or even $500 a
barrel. Iran's fifth-column operatives (a 1936-39 Spanish Civil War
term to explain forces that clandestinely undermine a populace
from within to aid an external enemy) are dotted up and down
the entire Gulf.
Bahrain is the U.S. 5th Fleet's headquarters in the Gulf
and the scene of yearlong clashes between a minority Sunni
royal family and a majority Shiite population that includes
thousands of pro-Iranian poor.
The Strait of Hormuz, between Oman and Iran, is the world's most important oil chokepoint with a daily
oil flow of 16 million barrels, roughly 33 percent of all
seaborne-traded oil, or 17 percent of oil traded worldwide.
On average, 13 crude oil supertankers (averaging 150,000
tons) per day pass eastbound through the strait to India, Japan, China and South Korea, supplying 75 percent of Asian markets. Hormuz channels
are 2 miles wide in either direction, separated by a 2-mile buffer zone.
Iran would be cutting off its nose to spite its face by sinking
a tanker in the Hormuz channels. But al Qaeda and its
affiliates would have no such qualms. Coming alongside a
supertanker at night in a rubber zodiac and planting a couple
of limpet mines on the waterline is no great feat for seaborne
terrorists.
Under prodding from Tehran, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza are known to have discussed a joint one-two punch in the
event of an Israeli nuclear attack.
Israel's policymakers argue that they cannot allow Israel to absorb a nuclear weapons attack and respond with a
nuclear second strike. Tens of thousands of Israelis would be
killed and a city destroyed before Israel could unleash retaliatory incineration against Iran.
Ron Tira, author of "The Nature of War: Conflicting
Paradigms and Israeli Military Effectiveness" (Sussex Academic Press, 2010), says "in the next stage Iran may focus on challenging the Saudi Royal House. ... [If it
fails,] the remaining Arab opposition to Iran may disintegrate as well."
An Israeli-Palestinian agreement is not even a shimmering
mirage on the darkening geopolitical horizon. The
much-ballyhooed Arab Spring and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq have undermined the balance of power and turned Iran into the dominant player that is now "developing a
strategic reach to the Mediterranean," says Mr. Tira.
Hence, the renewed danger of an Israeli pre-emptive strike against Iran's nukes.
*Arnaud de Borchgrave is
editor-at-large of The Washington Times and United Press
International,
a member of the Atlantic Council, and a senior fellow at CSIS. During a 30-year
career at Newsweek magazine, he covered most of
the world’s major news events, including 18 wars. De
Borchgrave’s awards include Best Magazine Reporting from
Abroad, Best Magazine Interpretation of Foreign Affairs,
and the George Washington Medal of Honor for Excellence
in Published Works. These include:
The Nuclear Black Market (1996);
Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism, Cyberwarfare: Averting an Electronic Waterloo
(1998); and
Cyber Threats and
Information Security: Meeting the 21st Century Challenge
(2001). This commentary was filed on
Monday, November 7, 2011©The
Washington Times, LLC.
